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Liberty mder Law: an Interpretation of the Principles of our Constitutional
Government. By William Howard Taft. New Haven, Published for the
University of Rochester by the Yale University Press, 1922. pp. 51.
In the compass of a single lecture at the University of Rochester, now
reprinted as a little book of fifty pages, the Chief Justice of the United States has
given a summary of American constitutional principles and achievements which
he who runs may read. It is charmingly written and is a marvel of condensation.
The author first shows in what respects our constitution was an essentially novel
experiment. It was the earliest attempt to limit the powers of different branches
of the government by a written document. It was the first instance in which a
federation created a central authority which was truly national in its character
and scope. It was the first consistent application of the principle of representa-
tive government, and of the system of checks and balances by which the
sovereign people may be safeguarded against its own outbreaks of passion or
enthusiasm. And, finally, it was the first constitution which carried with it a
system of orderly provisions for its own amendment. The book goes to show
our chief points of advantage over countries in which the system of checks and
balances is not in force, or in which direct action by the people takes the place
of deliberation in legislative assemblies. Next follows a clear presentation of
the need of a strong party system to make our political machinery work
effectively; and of the yet more fundamental need that the people themselves
should be well-informed, self-reliant, and self-controlled.
When an author says so much in so little space it seems unfair to complain
of what he omits. Yet I cannot help regretting that he gives so few words to
the specific political danger from which America finds it hardest to protect
herself-the passion for enforced equality at the expense of personal liberty,
which now dominates large groups of citizens who are very far removed from
being Bolshevists. As long as people care more for liberty than they do for
equality, we have little to fear from any form of democracy. We are about as
safe with the referendum and the initiative as we are with the legislature and its
committees-sometimes much safer, if we may judge from the recent history in
the United States and in Switzerland. When they begin to care more for
equality than for liberty, no form of government can protect them from reaping
the consequences of their own misjudgment. The history of the Fifteenth
Amendment-or for that matter, of the Eighteenth-shows how weak are our
constitutional safeguards in the face of any organized movement for enforced
equality between different classes or different parts of the country. I see no
good reason to think that under circumstances like these representative assemblies
are more conservative than the people as a whole, and some reason to think that
they are less so. When it comes to important questions of policy I would much
rather get them directly before the people, and fight them out on intellectual
grounds, as we fought out the slavery question from 1856 to i86o or the currency
question from i896 to Igoo. I am in cordial agreement with the author on
constitutional principles and ideals, but when I look for means for defending
them, I trust less than he does to Congress or the state legislatures, and more to




418 YALE LAW JOURNAL
Cases on Internatiotud Law. By James Brown Scott. American Case Book
Series. St. P~ul, West Publishing Co., 1922. pp. xxxvi, 1196.
In the preface to the first edition of this work, published in 1902, Dr. Scott
states that the underlying idea of the volume is that international law is part
of the English common law which is also the basic law of the United States.
After twenty years of study and active work in the field of international law,
he reaffirms this theory with new evidence in proof (pp. xi, xii) and with
expression of the hope that all countries may ultimately adopt international
law on the same basis-in the words of Sir Henry Maine, "as a main part of
the conditions on which a state is originally received into the family of civilized
nations." Dr. Scott ventures the further opinion that "they will because they
should." If he (Dr. Scott) is mistaken in this, he nevertheless prefers to be
generously wrong than to be niggardly right. (p. xiii) With this opinion doubtless
he noticed with satisfaction the express adoption of his theory in the recent
constitution of Germany and Austria. (p. ig)
The basis of Dr. Scott's philosophy is perhaps best indicated by the following
quotation:
"Whether we admit it with open eyes, or ostrich-like bury our heads in the
sand, there is such a thing as justice, independent of the State, above it and
beyond it, although the formulation of its principles may change according to
time, place and circumstances." (p. xv)
Doubtless Austinian jurists will continue to deny the existence of an objective
justice apart from a commanding or enforcing political authority but they cannot
deny the considerable acceptance of Dr. Scott's theory by the courts or the
wealth of evidence he has brought together in this book of the effort of courts
to discover and apply objective standards of international justice in the absence
of statute or treaty.
Even the World War has, in Dr. Scott's opinion, verified the soundness of
international law:
"It is no doubt true that the belligerent practices of nations have not squared
with their peaceful professions. Nevertheless the law of nations emerges from
the World War a system with foundations unimpaired, although the structure
bears outward marks of violence and unsightly scars, which only time can
cover." (p. xiii)
There is always a temptation in a casebook on international law to include
diplomatic controversies not strictly cases, but Dr. Scott has not yielded to it.
Although the present volume contains more opinions of continental European
courts and arbitral courts than did the edition of 1902, it is still strictly a case-
book and its sources are still largely within the English-speaking world. (See
Preface, p. xvi) It should' be noticed, however, that the value of the book is
increased through the inclusion in the appendices and in some instances in the
text of general treaties and national laws and ordinances bearing upon
international law.
In any casebook the editor is met by the dilemma of abbreviating his cases or
of confining himself to only a few. Dr. Scott has included 336 cases in iio8
pages-thus he has had to abbreviate. The process of reduction may be
accomplished in two ways. In his well known casebook, Pitt Cobbett has tried
one. He presents the facts and the opinion of the court in his own language.
This method has the advantage of making the facts perfectly clear and of
including all the essential reasoning in brief space but it fails to accustom the
student to judicial rhetoric. Dr. Scott follows the second method. He prints
the opinion in the court's own words but with a rigorous application of the
shears to portions which he deems less important. Opinions may differ as to
the importance of parts eliminated. Thus the reviewer regrets the omission in
the case of The Paquette Habana (p. 12) of the court's detailed examination of
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the history of the exemption claimed for innocent coast fishing vessels. Only
by perusing such an examination can the student appreciate fully the development
of international law through custom. Furthermore, with Dr. Scott's method the
facts are sometimes obscured. In the reviewer's opinion, a casebook should con-
sist not merely of quotations from judicial opinions but of cases, that is, of
reasoned decisions by competent authority upon stated facts. The student has
a right to know what of the opinion is dicta and what is essential for the
decision. There are not many cases in the present volume where a careful read-
ing will fail to reveal the pertinent facts but it is believed a brief statement of
surrounding circumstances in the editor's own language would often be of
service to the student.
The question of logical arrangement is a difficult one and in this respect
Dr. Scott's ideas have undergone modification. The 1922 edition contained seven
chapters in two parts whereas the present volume contains 31 chapters in three
parts. The classification closely follows that found in most textbooks of inter-
national law but its complexity has made necessary the frequent dividing of cases
(2 instances have been noted). The question may be raised whether the theory
of case-teaching does not forbid a sacrifice of the unity of a case from
considerations of logical arrangement.
Not only does the arrangement of the two editions differ, the content is also
so different that the present work might properly be called a supplement. It
contains over a hundred more cases than the earlier volume and almost two
hundred new cases. Nearly a hundred (to be exact, 8;) cases of the igo'
edition have thus been omitted. Some of them are ones which teachers using
the book will regret. In twenty years of unusually intense international inter-
course, including the greatest war in history and several lesser wars, it is to be
expected that cases worthy of inclusion in casebooks would have arisen. Still
when the law is well expressed in a case long familiar there seems little peda-
gogical advantage in substituting a new one. Students repeatedly fall upon cita-
tion of such cases as The Belgenland, Jones v. United States, The Parle~nent
Beige, The Scotia, Vavasseur v. Krupp, Wildenhus" Case, and will regret their
inability to find them in this book, though they may be found in the first edition.
All users of the book will, however, be pleased at the abundance of cases from
the Russo-Japanese and World Wars as well as cases arising from the recent
revolutions in Mexico (p. 70) and Russia (p. 6I).
The book is provided with ample footnotes, some of them taken from the
first edition which in turn borrowed with enlargement from Snow's Cases of 1893.
It also includes in appendices such documents as the League of Nations Covenant,
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Hague Conventions,
Washington Declarations on Submarines and Poisonous Gases, and British
retaliatory orders of the World War. The book will unquestionably take its
place, along with its predecessor, as an essential in the library of every teacher
and practitioner of international law. QUINCY WGHT
University of Minnesota
The Problem of Proof. By Albert S. Osborn. Albany, Matthew Bender &
Company, 1922. pp. xxi, 526.
Because of the importance of litigation, books dealing with the problems of
preparation and trial of cases are fairly numerous. Such books are of great
variety, both in point of view and in seriousness of purpose. It is a subject
which seems to tempt authors to over-indulgence in anecdote and reminiscence,
and to represent successful advocacy as the ability to win lawsuits in defiance of
facts.
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Mr. Osborn's point of view is that of an expert witness with long experience
in disputed document cases. His book is thoughtful and of serious purpose.
He has no bag of conjurer's tricks, no charlatan's magic. He rejects the
sophistry which would require a lawyer to accept any statement, no matter how
absurd, advanced by his client. To him the sifting and preparation of evidence
and its production in court are a serious business, calling for painstaking investi-
gation, thorough study and full use of all the faculties of a trained intellect.
The author's experience and interest have directed his attention, primarily, to
situations arising in litigation over disputed instruments. Of the twenty-eight
chapters, ten are devoted to that class of cases, six to problems common to all
litigation but with especial reference to questioned documents, and the remaining
twelve to more general considerations. This classification is not wholly accurate
because many chapters belong partly in one, partly in another class, but it will
serve, perhaps, as a rough indication of the author's division of his work. The
range of topics is unusually wide, especially in the discussion of trials, where are
treated such subjects as the atmosphere of a trial, cross-examination from the
standpoint of the witness, uninformed "expert" witnesses, and the designing and
lighting of court rooms.
Precedents in the law of evidence do not find favor in the author's eyes. Thus,
,he deals vigorously with those courts which have persisted in refusing to admit
standards of comparison of handwritings, as such, on the authority of cases
decided before his science emerged from the realm of guesswork. -His thesis is
right: courts and juries must have all possible assistance from science; and
doubtless the law has, in its traditional conservatism, failed to keep pace with the
progress of some of the sciences. It is well to remember, of course, that strange
claims are sometimes made in the name of science, and that not all such claims
are made good. With this caution in mind, however, it must be admitted that
the law of evidence is not free from precedents which are respectable merely
because of their age, and that courts do exist which appear to set such precedents
above knowledge.
If one were to look for faults in a work of such excellence as this, he might
not wholly approve the arrangement and order of materials nor what appears
to be a tendency to repetition; but neither criticism would seriously challenge
the substantial merits of the book. It might also be said that the author assumes
greater certainty than is always possible in detecting false claims of clients and
in demonstrating the truth in court. These are matters of emphasis, however,
and it is refreshing to find here a clear recognition that facts are facts, and a
good statement and analysis of the methods best calculated to make them appear
as such.
This book is worthy of a place beside the author's earlier work on "Questioned
Documents:' Together they should be of great assistance in the preparation of
any case involving a disputed writing. The present text merits the careful atten-
tion of all lawyers, and of all others interested in the efficient administration of
justice, despite the statement in the preface that it is not the purpose "to instruct
the seasoned veteran." To "those just enlisted" in the law, for whom the
author designs his work, it can scarcely fail to prove helpful and stimulating.
University of Minnesota Law School WsuR H. 
Cnay
Trial by Jury. By Robert von Moschzisker. Philadelphia, Geo. T. Bisel Go.,
1922. pp. x, 452.
This book contains fourteen lectures delivered by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at the Law School of the University of Penn-
sylvania in 1921, rearranged in textbook form, to which has been added a table
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showing the number of peremptory challenges of jurors allowed in criminal
trials in Pennsylvania.
The first three chapters deal with early forms of trial and the origin and
development of trial by jury. As the author frankly states, he has set forth
only the results of his study of secondary authorities, for he has made no
investigation of original sources. Consequently he has made no contribution of
value on this topic.
Chapters four to twelve inclusive contain much valuable practical information
for the law student who intends to practice in Pennsylvania. Besides explaining
generally the conduct of the various stages in a trial, the author, drawing upon
his experience as trial lawyer, trial judge, and justice of a court of last resort,
points out many pitfalls in the Pennsylvania rules of procedure. What young
practitioner would suspect the dire effects of electing to move to take off a
voluntary nonsuit, where he had not reserved leave to move therefor, instead
of merely beginning a new action? How would he know that if his witness
stated the result of his observations in the form of a conclusion, without objec-
tion from opposing counsel, the evidence would not support a verdict; whereas
if he stated the facts upon which he based his conclusion, his evidence would
be worth its face value? Would he imagine that a motion to instruct the jury to
disregard evidence might be proper when a motion to strike out the same evidence
would be improper? The exact effect of the form of objection to evidence,
the result of a wrong ruling on the scope of cross-examination, he certainly
could not work out on the basis of reason. These and other niceties of the
rules of the game, the Chief Justice explains concisely and clearly. He also
expounds the methods and purposes of motions for new trials and motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict as developed at common law and under
Pennsylvania statutory provisions. In his last two chapters he treats more
generally the constitutional guaranties of trial by jury, the power to waive such
trial, and the requirements for unanimity in verdicts.
Chief Justice Moschzisker is an admirer of trial by jury, and he considers the
procedural rules in Pennsylvania as approaching the ideal. But, with all due
deference, his lectures demonstrate Pennsylvania trial practice to embody what
Mr. Wigmore calls "the sporting theory" of litigation. It is important that men
who go to the bar where that theory is applied should know the rules of the
game and should realize the penalties that follow infractions of them. But is
it not equally important that they should understand that the object of a law-
suit is the ascertainment of truth, and that no rule of procedure has any justifi-
cation for existence save as a means to that end? The Chief Justice has rendered
the law student and the young lawyer of Pennsylvania a service in so clearly
putting before them a guide for conduct in the court-room, but would he not
have rendered the entire profession a greater service by lending the weight of
his position and authority to a rationalization of the rules of procedure in his
jurisdiction? It is high time that both bench and bar should realize that our
rules of pleading, practice, and evidence need thorough reformation.
EDMUND M. MORGAN
Yale University School of Law
Inheritance Taxation. By Lafayette B. Gleason and Alexander Otis. Third
edition. Albany, Matthew Bender & Co., 1g2. pp. lxix, i4.
Messrs. Gleason and Otis have again rendered to the profession most valuable
service in collating the statutes and decisions of the forty-seven jurisdictions in
which inheritance taxes are imposed and in bringing such collation up to August,
I92. The statutes, decisions and other material are conveniently arranged and
lawyers investigating the subject will find this a convenient starting point for
their work and will frequently find here all they need.
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The mass of detail involved and the number of jurisdictions covered make it
impossible to answer all questions finally and it is no just disparagement of the
book to say that many cases which are intricate or of especial importance
probably will require an examination of the original statutes and decisions.
The treatise is a guide which will always be of assistance.
What the reviewer thinks are some limitations are suggested in a notice of
the second edition in (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 947.
The author speaks on pages four and five of "natural rights." On page eight
appears the black-letter statement that an inheritance is "not a tax on property
but on the right to transmit and inherit it." As Professor Hohfield and others
have pointed out, the words "property" and "right" as here used have so many
possible meanings that clear thinking is difficult unless other words with more
sharply defined meanings are substituted. The power of transmission and the
privilege of inheriting would seem better usage. So too the term "natural right"
is now in some dispute.
The definition of the tax (p. i) as "a tax levied upon any form of donative
transfer from the dead to the living or by the living in contemplation of or'
effective at death" puts an unusual signification on the word "donative."
Intestate succession is not "donative" in the ordinary meaning of the word.
It is to be said that in this use of terminology the authors have followed the
courts as quoted on pages nine ff. although some courts speak of the "privilege"
of succession. But it seems that a careful analysis in more exact terminology
would conduce to clearer thinking and that it is not necessary to delay making
it until all courts have done the same thing.
Referring to details, the reference on page five of Sir William Blackstone as
"Mr. Blackstone" sounds odd. "Blackstone" or "Sir William Blackstone" would
be more ordinary usage. Also it would be more convenient if amendments
taking the place of earlier statutes were inserted in place where the repealed
matter would have occurred. For example, in Connecticut, sections 1261 ff.
(Gen. Sts. i98) were amended by later acts. The book would be easier to use




Political Ideas of 'the American Revolution. By Randolph Greenfield Adams.
Durham, N. C., Trinity College Press, 1922. pp. 2o7.
This first volume in the series of Trinity College Publications is one of the
ablest and clearest monographs in the literature of American political theory.
Mr. Adams has carefully limited his subject, has treated his material from a
sanely critical yet sympathetic viewpoint, and has shown admirable perspective
in placing his conclusions in their relations to American political thinking and to
world politics. This work successfully constitutes, as the author hoped it would,
"a contribution to International Law," "a chapter of Britannic Imperial History,"
and "a fragment of the history of the United States." The "monster of
sovereignty," deplored by George Washington, is shown to be the chief stumbling
block of international co6peration. "Jealous nationality will not surrender its
title to a supposed supremacy, and as a consequence, international adjustments are
rendered difficult, if not impossible." In the British Empire, or the Britannic
Commonwealth of Nations, a most completely equipped laboratory for the study
of international relations, there "is being worked out the idea of a league of
nations without too much idle discussion as to the residence of sovereignty."
The period before the American Revolution, in which the thirteen colonies were
struggling to become self-governing dominions, marks the beginning of the
evolution of this concept.
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Most of the ideas which the Americans formulated during the Revolution but
after the separation from Great Britain are regarded by Mr. Adams as stamped
with a different character by the fact that the thirteen colonies had decided to
declare their independence and to call themselves states, so he expressly reserves
them up to the Convention of 1787 for a future study on the "Political Ideas of
the Confederation." He feels justified in considering only incidentally the
ordinary political philosophy of the Revolution, the discussion about "natural
rights," "natural law," "social compact," and related controversies having been
adequately treated already in the works of Mr. Dunning, Mr. Merriam, and
others.
The ideas of the nature of the relation between England and her colonies
expressed by Burke, Pitt, Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and many
other men of this period in America and in the British Isles are analyzed and
classified under three general theories, and these theories are described and
diagrammed. The term, "The British Empire," represented the theory of
colonial dependency, or of a mother country and her children colonies; this was
the conception most generally held before 1784. The British Imperial Federa-
tion Theory might have been worked out in many ways but required representa-
tion of the colonies in an imperial parliament and was the logical result if the
colonial demand of no taxation without representation were to be satisfied by
representation in the taxing body. The Britannic Commonwealth of Nations
or the theory of Britannic Partnership was seen only dimly by even the most
farsighted and acute thinkers of the revolutionary period but is the one most
generally held in the "British Empire" to-day. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson,
and James Wilson seem to have thought of the Mother Country and her
American daughters in some such relationship hut received almost no hearing
either in America or in England.
The special emphasis placed by Mr. Adams on this early discussion of the
problem of British imperial order as an American contribution to the theory of
sovereignty and to the philosophy of International Law is the most important
addition made by him to the history of American political theory. He gives
excellent reasons and strong evidence for characterizing this family debate as
including a very early anticipation of the idea of a league of nations, and
contends very convincingly that the most practical working out of this idea is
going on to-day within the British Commonwealth of Nations. He quotes the
statement of the late Mr. Maitland: "The state that Englishmen knew was a
singularly unicellular state, and at critical times they were not too well equipped
with tried and rational thoughts with which to meet the case of Ireland, or
some communities, commonwealths or corporations in America which seemed
to have wills, and hardly fictitious wills, of their own, which became states, and
United States." (p. io) Mr. Adams maintains that the "centralizing force
which is trying to devise some central agency for reminding each of the groups
of society of its responsibility toward every other group" and "the decentral-
izing force which would preserve to each group sufficient authority to develop
freely according to its own genius," the seemingly mutually incompatible forces
now involved in the efforts for international association, are to be observed in the
political thought of the American Revolution; further, that "it was partly because
of the inability of men to preserve the balance between them that the Revolution
occurred and terminated as it did." (pp. 11-12)
One of the most valuable qualities of this excellent book is that, by promoting
a clearer comprehension of a much misunderstood and generally misrepresented
controversy, it helps to lay the foundation for the Anglo-American entente which
will be the most powerful force for world peace and international justice. The
teaching and writing of Professors George Burton Adams, McLaughlin, Van Tyne,
of the late Mr. George Louis Beer, and of a few other Americans have already
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done much to allay unreasoning and unreasonable anti-British prejudice in the
United States. Mr. Adams' conclusions in his scholarly essay on the Revolu-
tionary controversy seem to place him among those who are hoping and working
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